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Impact of Federal Acreage  Limitation
Policy  on Western Irrigated Agriculture
Charles V.  Moore
Long-Run  Average  Cost Curves  were  developed  for 18 Federal  irrigation  districts
indicating in  general  a constant  cost industry.  Conclusions were  that Interior's  acreage
limitation policy would cause no appreciable  loss in economic  efficiency nor an increase
in food  costs.  Implementation  of full-cost  water pricing  to  recapture Federal  subsidies
would  greatly reduce the amount of water demanded and significantly impact production
of forages  and other high water using  crops.
The  Reclamation  Act  of  1902  ushered  in
the most expensive  land settlement  program
in the history of the United States.  Prior land
settlement acts,  The Homestead Act of 1862,
The Timber Culture Act of 1873, The Desert
Land Act of 1877, The Timber and Stone Act
of 1878 and The Carey Act of 1894,  all had as
a  major  objective  the  opening  of the  public
domain for settlement purposes.  But the Re-
clamation  Act of 1902 was the first act with a
concomitant  commitment for large public in-
vestment  in  the  development  of  irrigation
works,  a vital input in an arid region if large-
scale,  stable  settlement  opportunities  were
to  be realized.
Water  greatly  enhances  the  productivity
and thus the market value of arid lands.  Since
water developed under these projects  was to
be provided to both public and private  lands
free  of  interest,  a  significant  subsidy  was
apparent  from  the  beginning.  The  Act con-
tained several antimonopoly and antispecula-
tion  clauses  including  a  residency  re-
quirement;  foremost was  the clause  limiting
ownership of land receiving  Federal water to
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160  acres  per  owner.  No  limit  was  ever
placed  on  ownership  of land  not  receiving
Federal  project  water nor  has  a  limit  ever
been placed  on the leasing of land from quali-
fied  owners.  Over the  years,  the  magnitude
of  the  subsidy  has  grown  as  interest  rates
have  increased.  The  repayment  period  has
been gradually lengthened to 40 and in some
cases 50 years and the water districts came to
be charged  according  to their  ability  to  pay
rather than for the full  costs.
From the  very  beginning,  Federal  irriga-
tion  water  development  has  generated
heated  arguments  polarizing  the  electorate.
Congressional  debate over the  1902 Act took
on a regional flavor with easterners opposing
the income  transfer inherent in western  wa-
ter  development  through  taxation  of  the
more populated East. Proponents of the 1902
Act flavored  their rhetoric with phrases such
as,  "settlement  opportunities  would  be
created for  people  who are  without homes,"
and,  its  purpose  "to  furnish  homes  for  the
homeless  and  farms  for  the  farmless"
[WPRS].  It was  this appeal  to the Act's social
promise which finally won  the day.
In  1980  when  a  series  of  bills  was  in-
troduced  in  Congress  to  modify  the original
Act,  the  debate  took  on  a  different  tone,
albeit  one  that  still  mirrored  the  original
public discussion.  No longer was  the debate
over to build or not to build water projects  in
the West  since  few feasible  projects  still  re-
mained  on  the drawing  boards.  Rather,  the
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argument of Federal project water users was
for loosening the acreage limitation based  on
the  allegations  that  larger  farms  were  more
efficient and continued  application of owner-
ship limits would raise the cost of food,  cause
large  acreages  to  eventually  be  abandoned
and inevitably  increase  the  use  of pesticides
causing  increased pollution to the rivers  and
streams  of the West.  At the other end  of the
spectrum,  supporters  of  retaining  acreage
limits at or near their existing level put forth
arguments  based on equity and fairness con-
siderations  usually citing statements made by
the  drafters  and  supporters  of  the  original
Act.
It  is  interesting  that  neither  of  the
polarized  groups  in the  more recent debates
spent much time or effort in supporting mea-
sures which  would,  in essence,  do away with
the subsidy.1 The heart of the dispute  seems
not to  revolve around how large  the subsidy
has become but rather around who should be
the  recipients.  Should  the  subsidy  and  the
opportunity  to  farm  in  a Federal  water  pro-
ject be  distributed  as  widely  as  possible,  as
the  small  farm  proponents  advocate,  or
should the distribution of subsidies  be based
on  the  prior  distribution  of  wealth  (land)
allowing  economic  forces  alone  to select  the
ultimate beneficiaries?
Objectives
The  objectives  of  this  report  are  (1) to
present  the  relative  economic  efficiency  of
different  size  and  types  of farms,  (2) to  ana-
lyze  their  ability  to  generate  incomes  (net
cash  flow),  (3)  to  evaluate  the  trade-offs  be-
tween  economic  efficiency  and  viability  as
defined  in  objectives  1 and  2,  and  (4) assess
the  possible  impact of eliminating  subsidies
through full-cost water  pricing.
Procedures
To  accomplish  this  task,  18  irrigation  dis-
tricts  receiving  Federal water were  selected
for  detailed  study.  This  was  not  a  random
1Seckler and Young proposed  water pricing  as  an alter-
native to  administrative  regulations.
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sample, but rather  the districts were chosen
so  that  they  embraced  the  entire  range  of
farms (size,  type and per acre  income) found
in the area served by Bureau  of Reclamation
(BOR).  Individual  enterprise  and  farm
budgets were then prepared for each of these
districts  in  consultation  with  local  farmer
panels,  Cooperative  Extension  Service  and
Universities.
Specific  assumptions  used  in  developing
enterprise  and  farm  budgets  are  as  follows:
Prices - Water  Resources  Council  nor-
malized  commodity  prices  were  used  to  de-
termine  prices  received  by farmers  in  each
state.  These  prices  were  assumed  constant
for all farm sizes.  Yields - district crop yields
were  based  on  the  most  recent  three-year
average  yields  for  irrigated  crops. 2 Input
Costs - costs  of production  inputs were set
at area average  1978 levels. Interest Rate and
Capital Costs - actual  1978  Production
Credit  Association  and  Federal  Land  Bank
rates  in  the  area  were  used  to  determine
interest  charges  on  operating  capital,
machinery  and land  investments.  Based  on
typical  PCA  and  FLB  down  payment  re-
quirements  averaging 20 percent in each area
and  loan  life (5 to  7 years on equipment  and
30  years  on  land  and  improvement)  amor-
tized loan payments were calculated in order
to arrive at estimates of net cash flow.  For the
static budgets a typical crop mix and machin-
ery  complement  for  each  farm  size3 was
specified by a panel of local growers working
with a project research assistant and the local
agricultural  extension  agent,  The  crop  mix
varied by farm size if this reflected conditions
within an  individual  irrigation project.
Financial Viability
Annual  net  cash  flow  before  taxes  to  un-
paid  family  labor,  management  and  equity
2No  data was available  on yield  by farm size.
'The  machinery  complement  could  have  been  op-
timized with respect to a crop  mix in the L. P.; howev-
er,  the  existing  complement  was  considered  reason-
ably  efficient  and therefore  the  most useful for  repre-
senting the  fixed plant  in the short run.
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was used as a measure  of farm financial feasi-
bility in this  study.4 Net cash flow is the cash
available for family living expenses,  after cash
production  expenses,  principal  and  interest
payments  on land and machinery  loans  have
been deducted  from gross  crop  sales.
That  is:
Gross  Farm  Sales
Less:  Cash  Production  Expenses
Equals:  Gross Margin  (Cash)
Less:  Amortized  Loan  Payments  on
Land,  Improvements  and
Equipment
Equals:  Return  to Family  Labor,
Management  & Equity
(cash flow)
The bottom  line in the above formula pro-
vides one  measure of the economic  viability 5
of a  farm.  The  assumptions  used  to  deter-
mine the bottom line  in the  study are  based
on  Interior's  Proposed  Rules  and  Regula-
tions,  which  state that land  ownership  by an
individual  is  limited  to  160  acres  and  farm
operations  in  excess  of this  must  be leased,
up  to  a  limit  of 480  acres.  Family  organiza-
tions of four or more people could farm up to
960 acres  receiving  Federal project water  of
which  not  more  than  640  acres  could  be
owned  [USDI].  Land in excess  of legal  enti-
tlement  must  be  sold  as  its  "excess"  land
value.  This  land value  is  the appraised value
today  if the project had never been  built.6
4Self-employment  and  individual  income  taxes  can  af-
fect  viability  but were not considered  in this study.
5Nonmonetary factors are also important, since viability
also  depends  on what the  family  needs  or wants.  For
these  reasons,  a satisfactory  cash flow may  differ  from
one  family to another  and from  one region to another.
6USBR appraisals of excess  land value are based on the
current  market price  of comparable  lands  outside  the
district  with credit  given for clearing,  leveling,  capital
improvements,  permanent crops,  and the contribution
ofnonproject  water supplies if any are present.  All land
up to 320 acres was assumed to be owned. For the 640
acres  and  1,280 acre  farm  the balance of the farm was
assumed  to be  leased.  All  dryland was  assumed  to be
owned.
Cash returns  to unpaid labor, management
and  equity  were  estimated  for  four  farm
sizes,  160  acres,  320  acres,  640  acres  and
1,280  acres  based  on  a typical  crop  mix  for
each  district  where  field  crops  were  domi-
nant.  Cash  returns  for  three farm  sizes,  40
acres,  80 acres  and  160 acres were estimated
for  the  three  of  the  18  projects  in  which
perennial crops  (fruit trees) dominate.
Two net cash  return estimates  were  made
for  each  farm  size  analyzed:  First,  the  net
return for a beginning farmer  purchasing ex-
cess land under terms of commercial lending
sources  in  1978;  and second,  the net  return
for  an  existing  farm  operator.  Existing farm
operators  were  assumed  to  have  purchased
land  at an  earlier  time  and at  a lower  price
and  mortgage  interest  rate  and  to  enjoy,
therefore,  a much higher equity position be-
cause  of land  value  appreciation.
In  the  "existing  farmer"  analysis,  it  was
assumed  that  land  was  purchased  in  1958
based  on  an  average  turnover  rate  of  2.5
percent,  i.e.,  40  years.  Thus  the  average
farm has been owned 20 years.  Average  own-
ers  equity  for  each  state  was  taken  from
[USDA]  and ranged from 74  to 94  percent.
Empirical Results
Results  of  this  analysis  are  presented  in
Table 1 for all 18 case-study districts. The net
cash  flow  for  beginning  farmers  purchasing
excess  land  in  the 18  districts  varies  widely.
For instance,  returns  to  unpaid  labor,  man-
agement  and  equity  on  160  acre  field-crop
farms  range  from  a  negative  $8,200  in  the
Milk  River  Project  in  Montana  to  a positive
$19,600  in  the  Elephant  Butte  District  in
New Mexico.  As farm size increases,  a higher
proportion  of the  total  farm  labor  is  paid  a
cash  wage;  therefore  in  many  cases,  cash
flows  appear  more  favorable  to  the  smaller
farm sizes.  This  is  especially  true in districts
where  economies  of  size  are  not  large  and
excess land values  are relatively close to  cur-
rent market land prices.
In  comparing  new  and  existing  farm
operators, the latter, with their assumed high
owner  equity  and  lower  mortgage  interest
rates,  show a much more favorable  cash flow.
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Returns  to  unpaid  labor,  management  and
equity  for  existing  farmers  on  the  160  acre
farms  are  positive  for all  projects  and  range
from $7,800  in Grand  Valley  of Colorado  to
$34,900  in  Elephant  Butte  District  in  New
Mexico.  Under  the  assumptions  used to  de-
scribe the existing farm operator,  annual cash
flows  tend to increase  as farm  size increases.
In the three districts dominated by peren-
nial  crops,  cash flows are  positive  in all farm
sizes,  for  beginning  and  existing  farm
operators  alike.
Farm net cash flows therefore  vary widely
across  the  18  case-study  districts  and  are
heavily dependent  on the  equity  position  of
the farm  operator.  Thus,  the policy maker  is
faced  with  the  task  of placing  an  arbitrary
single-size  limitation  on  an  industry  quite
heterogeneous  in  its performance.
Economies of Farm Size
Linear programming  was  used to  develop
short-run  average  cost  curves  (SRAC).  This
technique selects the profit maximizing  com-
bination of crops  subject to the supply of high
value  cropland,  water  and  the  machinery
complement  developed  for  the  representa-
tive  farm  budgets  analyzed  in  the  previous
section.  Land costs but not unpaid  labor cost
were  included  to obtain  the  planning  curve
faced by different  participants.
Land  was  priced  at  two  levels  in  each
district  both  supplied  by  BOR  appraisers.
First  the  "Excess  Land  Value",  and second
the current market value.  Thus,  a beginning
farm  operator  purchasing  excess  land  would
face  an entirely  different cost structure  than
either  one  who  had  purchased  land  at  the
current  market  value  of one  who  had  pur-
chased  land  at  an  earlier  time  but  whose
opportunity cost is the current market value.
One concern of policy makers was the viabili-
ty of new entrants purchasing  land at  excess
land  values.  A  concern  here  was  that these
new entrants not be induced into investing in
a  nonviable  enterprise.  Thus  excess  land
values  were  used  to  generate  the  average
total  cost  curves  presented  in  this  analysis7
and  will be used subsequently  in  estimating
economic rents.
Crop activity possibilities in the linear pro-
gramming  models  were  the  same  as  those
specified  in  the  farm  budgets  reported  in
Table  1.  High  value  speciality  crops  were
constrained to the same proportion  of land as
used  in  the  typical  farm  budgets  to  avoid
possible  price  depressing  levels  of produc-
tion.
Long-run  average  cost  curves  were  then
estimated  by  tracing  an  envelope  of the
SRAC  for  each  project.  [For  additional  de-
tail  and  discussion,  see  Madden;  Carter
and  Johnston;  and  Miller,  Rodewald  and
McElroy,  who also  used this  approach.]
The  results  of  the  linear  programming
analysis  are presented  in Figures  1, 2,  3 and
4.  All  18  LRAC  exhibit  a rapidly  declining
average  cost  per  unit  of  output  up  to  the
point where gross farm sales exceed $100,000
and in  most  districts  the  LRAC  drop  below
the breakeven  level of $1.00 of total cost per
$1.00 of gross  sales.
Use  of  gross  sales  as  a  measure  of farm
output  means  that  commodity  prices  were
used  as  weights  to  derive  a  dollar common
denominator.  This was done so that compari-
sons  could  be  made  between  projects.  In
reality,  however, commodity prices  fluctuate
and  therefore  the  LRAC  could  be  expected
to shift  up  and down over  time.  The critical
characteristic  of these LRAC  is their general
shape,  not  their position  on the  graph.  The
relative  "flatness"  of  the  curves  after  crop
sales reach the $150,000  to $200,000 range is
their  most  important  attribute  for  acreage
limitation  policy.
Most of the LRAC exhibit a constant or flat
average  cost  once  farm  output  exceeds  the
$150,000  to $200,000  range.  A limited num-
ber exhibit a slightly increasing  average  cost
at larger outputs since the cost of managerial
and  supervisory  labor  increases  faster  than
7Short- and long-run  average cost curves under alterna-
tive land cost assumptions  are presented in a forthcom-
ing  report,  Structure and  Performance of  Western
Irrigated  Agriculture: With  Special Reference  to the
Acreage Limitation Policy of the  U.S.  Department of
Interior, C. V. Moore,  D.  L.  Wilson, and T.  C.  Hatch,
Giannini  Information  Series,  University of California.
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technical  economies  of size.  Hired  supervi-
sory labor by farm size was included as a fixed
cost.  A  small  number  of  LRAC  exhibit  a
slightly decreasing average  cost over the en-
tire  range  of output.
Acreage to Achieve
Specified Efficiency
A  major  question  raised  by  any  acreage
limitation  policy is,  how much  economic effi-
ciency is  lost,  if any,  by a decision  to reduce
the  size  of  existing  farms  through  the  en-
forcement  of ownership  and farm  operating
size  limitations?  In  other  words,  how  large
must  a  beginning  farmer  be  in  order  to
achieve a reasonable  level of efficiency.  Table
2 presents the approximate  acreage  and gross
crop sales  required to achieve 95 percent and
98  percent  (105  and  102  percent)  of  the
minimum average total cost derived from the
economies  of size  analysis.
The  data  in  Table  2  indicate  that,  except
for the tree fruit districts which require even
smaller acreage,  95 percent of the maximum
economic  efficiency  can  be  achieved  by  a
farm  size  in the  300 to  450 acre  range and a
gross  crop  sales  in  the  $75,000  to  $150,000
range.
A  somewhat  larger  acreage  is  required  to
achieve 98 percent of potential economic effi-
ciency.  For  most of the  case-study  districts
this level of efficiency  is achieved  at or below
900 acres with most of the districts in the 320
to  640 acre  range and gross crop  sales in the
$150,000 to  $300,000 range.
Minimum Acreage to
Achieve  Specified Incomes
The amount of money available to the farm
family  after  production  expenses  and  debt
service  is one measure of farm  viability. This
is especially important to the beginning farm-
TABLE 2.  Approximate  Irrigated Crop Acreage  and Gross Sales to Achieve 95 and 98 Percent
of  Minimum  Long-Run  Average  Costs,  Beginning  Farmer,  Excess  Land  Value,
1978.
95  percent  98  percent
District  Acres  Sales  Acres  Sales
Black Canyon  740  $250,000  900  $315,000
Coachella  30  150,000  40  200,000
Columbia  Basin  380  210,000  520  290,000
East  District
Elephant Butte  410  284,000  440  305,000
Farwell  680  300,000  1,000  390,000
Glenn-Colusa  580  320,000  620  345,000
Goleta  22  71,000  40  130,000
Goshen  420  155,000  550  205,000
Grand Valley  320  83,500  900  153,000
Imperial - light soil  300  90,000  375  150,000
heavy soil  890  400,000  1,350  490,000
Lower  Yellowstone  645  110,000  735  155,000
Altus-Lugert  170  85,000  200  95,000
Milk  River  350  110,000  570  150,000
Moon  Lake  450  55,000  475  64,000
Oroville-Tonasket  75  220,000  78  230,000
Truckee-Carson  220  50,000  275  60,000
Welton-Mohawk  300  180,000  320  230,000
Westlands - with  pump  420  360,000  510  440,000
without pump  152  100,000  500  400,000
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er.  Table 3 presents the minimum crop acre-
age  required  to  achieve  three  levels  of cash
flow ($10,000,  $15,000  and $20,000) based on
the  linear  programming  analysis  and  excess
land values.
Under  the  assumptions  of this  study  only
one  district,  Altus-Lugert,  requires  more
than  960  acres  to  achieve  a  cash  flow  of
$20,000.  Most of the  remaining  districts  re-
quire crop acreages  in the range of 150 to 320
acres  to  achieve  a  return  to  unpaid  labor,
management and equity of $20,000 annually.
Nonmonetary considerations  and off-farm in-
come are also important determinants of fam-
ily farm  viability.  In  1978,  the national aver-
age net income per farm operator family was
$22,866.  Of this amount,  $12,829 was earned
off-farm.  The  national  average  net  farm  in-
come on  a basis  comparable to that shown  in
Table  3 was  $10,037.
Risk
The LRAC presented in Figures  1 through
4  are  static  in  nature.  Year-to-year  fluctua-
tions  in  prices,  yields  and  input  costs  will
cause these curves  to  shift  up and down.  To
estimate  the  relative  riskiness  of production
in  each  district  and  therefore  the  expected
stability  of these  curves  over  time,  the  total
variance  and coefficient  of variation  of gross
income was estimated for the minimum aver-
age  total  cost  crop  mix  for  each  district.8
These  data  were  estimated  using  Tintner's
Variate  Difference  Method applied to  a time
8A time series  of district  average  gross  incomes  (price
times quantity)  was developed  using district  crop  re-
ports.  Using  the  equation  for  combining  variances  a
total variance  for each  district was calculated.
TABLE 3.  Minimum  Crop  Acreage  Required to Achieve $10,000, $15,000 and  $20,000 Annual
Cash  Return to Unpaid  Family Labor, Management  and Equity; Optimized Crop Mix
Under  Excess  Land Value,  Beginning Farmer,  1978.
District  10,000  15,000  20,000
dollars
Black Canyon  280  400  620
Coachella  38  77  150
Columbia  Basin  100  125  135
East District
Elephant  Butte  40  60  80
Farwell  210  265  310
Glenn-Colusa  120  140  150
Goleta  23  25  30
Goshen  180  200  230
Grand Valley  160  200  300
Imperial - light soil  190  240  260
heavy soil  250  280  310
Lower Yellowstone  215  270  335
Altus-Lugert  a  a  a
Milk  River  290  430  525
Moon  Lake  255  330  400
Oroville-Tonasket  23  26  29
Truckee-Carson  140  160  275
Welton-Mohawk  160  175  210
Westlands - with pump  160  180  210
without pump  150  170  180
'Not  possible to achieve this  return under assumed  prices and  yields.
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series  of  prices,  yields  and  gross  incomes.
The  results  are  presented  in  Table  4.  In
general,  the fruit growing  districts show the
highest  risk  in  relation  to  expected  gross
income.  Among  the  field  crop  districts,
Elephant  Butte  grows  a  high  proportion  of
speciality  crops  while  Glenn-Colusa  is  pre-
dominantly  a  rice  growing  area  where  wet
weather  at planting  or  harvest  time  can  sig-
nificantly  affect  yields.  Again,  the  policy
maker is  faced with setting a limit on acreage
in  an  industry  not  only  heterogeneous  in
expected income  but in  the variability about
that income  as  well.
Full-Cost Pricing  of Project Water
Most of the controversy over Federal acre-
age limitation policy centers around who is to
receive  the  large  subsidies  associated  with
Federal water projects.  A logical question is,
what would  happen  if all or part of the sub-
sidy  was  eliminated  by  recapture  through
higher  water  charges  to  landowners  and
operators?
In  examining  these  questions,  U.S.  De-
partment of Interior's definitions  for full cost
and subsidy were used [USDI].  That is,  "full
cost of irrigation water  includes all  construc-
tion costs allocated to irrigation plus all oper-
ation  and  maintenance  cost  deficits  with
interest  charged  on  both.  The  irrigation
subsidy equals the unpaid full costs net of the
present  worth  of future  payments"  [USDI]
(see Table  5).
TABLE  4.  Relative  Risk of Gross Income  by District.
Coefficient  of
District  State  Total variance  variation
percent
Field  crops
Black Canyon  ID  134.1  4.3
Columbia  Basin  WA  488.3  4.7
East District
Elephant  Butte  NM  13,560.1  19.6
Farwell  NB  194.5  6.1
Glenn-Colusa  CA  4,175.3  15.8
Grand Valley  CO  28.4  2.5
Imperial - light soil  CA  3,960.8  8.6
heavy soil  2,840.3  9.5
Lower Yellowstone  MT  573.0  7.8
Altus-Lugert  OK  432.4  15.3
Milk River  MT  103.6  14.9
Moon  Lake - high area  UT  13.0  3.4
low area  43.6  4.4
Truckee-Carson  NV  170.4  5.8
Welton-Mohawk  AZ  1,199.0  6.5
Westlands-  with pump  CA  5,481.7  12.9
without pump  4,314.2  12.3
Perennial crops
Coachella  CA  50,963.1  5.8
Goleta  CA  378,052.8  20.8
Oroville-Tonasket  WA  279,904.4  36.0
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TABLE 5.  Increase  in  Land Values  Due  to Project Water  and  Estimated  Subsidy Per Acre.
Estimated  Excess  Current  market  Increase
subsidy  land value  land price  per  acre in
Project  per acre a  per acred  per acre  land value
f
dollars
Oroville-Tonasket,  WA  417  1,500  1,550  50
Black Canyon  #2,  ID  762  1,200  1,600  400
East Columbia  Basin, WA  1,619  850  1,500  650
Goleta, CA  1,378b  15,500
e 17,500e  2,000
Truckee-Carson,  NV  931  410  1,800  1,390
Glenn-Colusa,  CA  101  1,200  1,700  500
Westlands,  CA  1,422c  550  1,500  950
Coachella,  CA  1,000  1,450  2,000  550
Welton-Mohawk,  AZ  1,786  1,245  2,600  1,355
Imperial, CA  149  1,700  1,800  100
Moon  Lake,  UT  58  350  750  400
Grand  Valley, CO  1,623  600  1,900  1,300
Elephant Butte,  NM  363  775  1,800  1,025
Altus-Lugert,  OK  675  765  1,200  435
Malta,  MT  812  325  600  275
Lower Yellowstone #1, MT  507  750  1,300  550
Farwell,  NB  1,466  1,100  1,200  100
Goshen, WY  416  605  1,250  645
aRetroactive to  year of initial construction in 1978 dollars.
bAverage for entire  Cachuma Project.
CAverage  for San  Luis Unit.
dlncludes value of land  and irrigation  improvements except  irrigation  pumps.
Includes value of mature  avocado grove.
fMeasured  as the difference  between  current  market  land  price and  excess  land values.
Source:  USBR appraisers  [WPRS].
The  agricultural  value of land9 is  the  dis-
counted present value of the expected stream
of future  net  income.  Thus  any  increase  in
irrigation  water  costs  would  be  expected  to
have a depressing effect on land prices.  If the
preproject (excess) land value is measured by
its market value today without the benefits of
the project,  then the difference  between  ex-
cess  land  value  and  current  market  price
should  represent  the land  market's  estimate
of the present value of the economic rent due
to the  project.  Further,  if the  project bene-
fit/cost  ratio  is  exactly  1.0,  land  value  en-
hancement  (capitalized  economic  rent)
9Market  price of agricultural  land  may greatly  exceed
the agricultural  value  due to inflation,  capital gains  tax
policy and the  intrinsic value  placed on land  by some
buyers as  a store of value.
should just equal Interior's calculated  unpaid
full cost since both land values are affected by
tax policy and inflation.  Under this situation,
recapture  of the project subsidy through full-
cost pricing should force the market price for
land  down  to  its  excess  land  value.  Table  5
displays  information  on both  land  value  en-
hancement and the calculated subsidy for all
18  case-study districts.
Farm  owners  and  operators  may  not  be
able  to capture  the  full  amount  of the  cal-
culated  subsidy.  If the  ex  post benefit/cost
ratio of a project is less than 1.0 either due to
errors  in  estimating  benefits  or  cost  over-
runs,  the full  amount of the income  transfer
may  not  be  received  by  landowners  and
operators.
There  are,  therefore,  two measures  of the
income  transfer  to  an  irrigation  project.
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First,  the  calculated  one based  on the  costs
and interest rates  used by  Interior.  Second,
the  land  buyers  estimate  of  the  economic
rents  as reflected  in  his bid price  for project
land  as  compared  to the  appraised  value  of
the same land without the project.  As  shown
in Table 5, only seven of the 18 districts show
enhanced  land  values  greater  than  the  cal-
culated subsidy.  In other words,  in  11 of the
districts  the  amount  of the  economic  rents
actually  captured  by  landowners  through
value  enhancement  was  less  than  society's
investment  in  that land  as  indicated  by the
calculated  subsidy.  Two  hypotheses  can  be
made:  First as  indicated  earlier,  the  ex post
benefit/cost  ratio  may  have  been  less  than
1.0.  Second, there may be oligopsony  power
in the land rental market which allows  a few
large  lessees  to capture  a potion  of the  pro-
ject subsidy.  That is,  if ownership  was atom-
ist in turn leasing to a few very large lessees,
the  market  power  of the  latter  could  allow
them  to  capture  a  portion  of the  economic
rent.
Faced with large increases  in water prices,
farm  operators  would  be  expected  to  make
two  types of adjustments  to mitigate the im-
pact  of full-cost  water  charges:  (1) shift  to
more  water  conserving  technologies  to  im-
prove  on-farm  irrigation  efficiencies  and  (2)
adjust  the  crop  mix  to  crops  with  a  higher
return per unit of water.10
Using the basic model from the economies
of size estimations,  additional irrigation tech-
nologies  for  each  crop  were  specified  and
parametric  water  prices  run.  Results  of this
analysis for 17 irrigation districts provided (1)
the  optimum  quantity of irrigation  water  at
each  water  price  in  $5  per  acre-foot  incre-
ments,  (2)  the  optimum  combination  of
crops,  the optimum  irrigation technology  for
each possible water  price and  (3) the level  of
farm  income  at each  water price.
1°Lin,  Dean  and  Moore  have  shown  that  producing
crops  with  a  higher  return  to  water  also  involves
accepting  a greater income  variability  and,  therefore,
business risk. Thus,  risk averse producers are forced  to
move  out along their E-V frontier in order to  mitigate
higher water costs,  although utility may be decreased.
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The impact of full-cost pricing can be dem-
onstrated  by using Westlands Water District
of  California  as  an  example.  The  derived
demand  curve  for  irrigation  water  was  ob-
tained by parameterizing water price in  four
farm size L. P. models. The weighted average
water use per acre was obtained by weighing
each  farm  size by  the  proportion  of land  in
that farm  size interval.  The  results  are  pre-
sented in Figure  5.
The vertical dotted line indicates the 1972-
76  average  farm  headgate  delivery  by  the
district.  The asterisk indicates  the 1978 aver-
age cost per acre-foot of $15.80.  These results
indicate  that  at  1978  water  charges,  West-
lands farm  operators  could  productively  use
more  water  than  can  be  delivered  under
their existing water supply contract.  The full-
cost  price  of water  for  Westlands  has  been
estimated  by  USDI  at  $67.56 per  acre-foot.
Obviously from the derived  demand curve  if
all water was charged  at this price only about
0.5 acre-feet  per  acre  would  be demanded,
and a large  acreage  would be  left fallow  be-
cause  crop  returns  no  longer  would  cover
variable  costs  except  for a limited acreage  of
high  value  tomatoes.
An  alternative  to  charging  for  all water  at
the full-cost price  would  be to create  a two-
tiered  price  structure  with  a  base  supply
charged  at the current subsidized rate  and a
second  price tier which  charges  full  cost for
any water used in  excess of the base  supply,
as was suggested by Seckler  and Young.  Us-
ing  Interior's  Proposed  Rules  and  Regula-
tions  farm  size limit of 960 acres  as the base
supply,  full  cost  could  be  charged  for  any
water purchased  in  excess  of the 2,438 acre-
foot historic allotment for a 960 acre farm.  As
an  example,  L.P.  runs for a  1,280 acre  farm
indicate  that no water would be purchased  at
the  full-cost  rate.  Farm  operators  would  be
expected  to  scale  back  to  a  maximum  farm
size  of  960  acres  and  turn  back  leases  in
excess  of that acreage.
Policy  Implications
To  set  a single  acreage  limit  applicable to
the wide  diversity  in farming,  climate,  mar-
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Figure 5. Demand for Irrigation Water, Westlands  I (with pump).
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kets  and  soils  represented  by  irrigation  dis-
tricts  and contractors  served  by  BOR across
the 17 western  states is an extremely difficult
task.
Three  basic policy  questions  are raised  by
the  proposed  acreage  limitation  rules  and
regulations;  first,  what  is  the loss in  efficien-
cy,  if any,  if existing  excess  lands are  sold to
beginning  farmers  to  create  new,  smaller
farms?
The second  policy  question  relates  to the
equity  question  of,  how  widely  should  the
benefits  and subsidies  of Federal  water pro-
jects  by distributed? Any distribution  policy
must  be  subject  to  the  limitation  that  the
annual  cash  flow  from  operating  the  farm
must be positive  and at a level  high enough
to  make the farm  a viable operation.  A corol-
lary question then is,  what is a viable  level of
income  as  measured  by  the  return  to
operators  unpaid  labor,  management  and
equity  given  the  opportunities  for  off-farm
employment?
Third,  can  removal of the causa belli, irri-
gation  subsidies,  through  recapture  by
means  of full-cost pricing,  eliminate the need
for administrative  limitation of farm  size and
land  ownership  or would  the  cure  be worse
than the disease?
Efficiency
Two points are important in discussing the
policy implications  of the Long-Run  Average
Cost  curves  presented  in  Figures  1 through
4.  First,  under  1978 income  and cost condi-
tions  including excess  land values,  almost  all
of the  18 case-study  districts  show some por-
tion of the LRAC  falling below the breakeven
level,  i.e.,  showing  a  positive  net  income.
Second,  average  costs  decrease  rapidly  as
output  increases  until gross  farm  sales reach
the level of about $100,000.  In general,  after
most  of the  economies  of size  are  achieved
the  Long-Run  Average  Cost curve  becomes
flat or constant. 11 In  the structure literature,
llMiller,  et al. and Carter  and Johnston,  in  a review  of
California  studies,  found the LRAC  to become  flat  or
constant  for most types  of farms.
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an industry with this characteristic  would be
classified  as a constant  cost industry.
The  policy  implications  of a constant  cost
industry  are  twofold.  First,  reducing  farm
sizes  to  a point  to the  left  of the  minimum
ATC  would  have  a  direct  impact  on  the
wealth  of current landowners.  Costs  of pro-
duction  would be raised which in turn would
reduce the economic rents to the landowner.
This argument is  developed  in detail in both
Miller,  Rodewald  and McElroy  and Hall and
LeVeen.  Given the farm size limits proposed
by Interior and the results  shown in Table 2,
this  impact should be  small.
Second,  policy makers  expressed  concern
for the possible  impact of acreage  limitations
on  food prices.  Given that Reclamation  Law
is  applicable  to  only  about  one-third  of the
irrigated  acreage  in  the west,  in  a  competi-
tive  industry,  market  forces  would  expand
output  to  the  point  where  in  long-run
equilibrium  price  equaled  minimum  ATC.
Thus  there  is  no  gain  in  efficiency  which
might  translate  into  lower  food prices  from
having  farms  larger than  those  exhibiting
minimum average total cost. 1 2 Stated another
way, there is no efficiency loss to society from
creating  smaller  farms  out  of larger farms  if
the average  total  cost  for both  farm  sizes  is
the same.  For the individual farm owner in a
constant cost  industry,  there is  still  a strong
incentive  to  expand  farm  size  because  net
farm income  increases  in  proportion  to  farm
size.
If the Average  Total Cost curve  is  increas-
ing  (an  increasing  cost  industry)  disecon-
omies of size  are present.  Under this condi-
tion there is an efficiency gain to society from
creating  smaller farms  (at the  minimum  Av-
erage Total Cost) out of larger farms.  For the
individual farm operator in an increasing  cost
industry  there  is  still  an incentive to  expand
farm  size  as  long  as  the  long-run  marginal
cost  is  below  the  breakeven  level  because
12This hypothesis  was  tested  using  CARM,  a California
statewide  quadratic  programming  model.  State  total
production  and  equilibrium  prices  remained  almost
constant  but  the  location  of some  production  shifted
between  subareas.
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total net farm  income  is  still  increasing.  The
incentive  to  expand,  however,  is  less under
this  situation  than  under  a  constant  or  de-
creasing  cost industry.  The data  shown  ear-
lier  in Table  2,  acreage  required  to achieve
95 and  98 percent of minimum  average  total
cost,  are  heavily  dependent  on the  slope  or
lack  of  slope  in  the  LRAC.  A  wide  spread
between  the  acreage  for  95  percent  of
minimum average total cost and 98 percent of
minimum  average  total reflects  a flat or con-
stant  cost  situation.  The  extreme  case  is the
Westlands  Water  District  which  exhibits  a
very  gradual  decreasing  cost  situation  over
the  entire  range  of the curve.  On the  other
hand  a district  such  as  Moon  Lake  in  Utah
with  a relative  steep  slope exhibits  a narrow
spread  between  the 95  percent  and 98  per-
cent  level  of achievement  acreage.
For the  18  case-study  districts,  presented
in  Table  2,  only  2 exceeded  the WPRS  pro-
posed  acreage  limitation  of 960  acres  at  the
98  percent  achievement  level  under  excess
land  values.
Equity
The equity or fairness question stems from
the magnitude and distribution of the Feder-
al  subsidy to water users.  The original Recla-
mation Act of 1902 had as one of its goals,  the
widest reasonable  distribution of the benefits
of Federal  water  projects.  However,  taking
this  goal to  its  extreme would  create  a large
number of very small farms unable  to gener-
ate  sufficient  cash  flow  to  service  debt,  pay
farm  expenses  and contribute  something  to-
ward family living expenses.  Thus, the equity
goal  is  restricted  by  the  question  of  farm
viability.
In Table 3 the acreage  by district required
to  generate  $10,000,  $15,000  and  $20,000
annual  return  to unpaid  labor,  management
and equity (cash  flow) based on  an optimized
crop  mix  and  excess  land  values  was  pre-
sented.  Out  of  the  18  case-study  districts,
only one  was not able  to generate  an annual
cash flow of at least $20,000 within the upper
limit of 960 acres contained in  Interior's Pro-
posed  Rules  and  Regulations.  Of course  as
noted  earlier,  off-farm  income  is  an  impor-
tant  contributor  to  family  income  and  thus
viability.
Full-Cost Pricing
Water  in  Federal  irrigation  projects  is
highly  subsidized;  however,  all  of this  sub-
sidy is not captured  by landowners and farm
operators.  A  policy  of  subsidy  recapture
through  full-cost  pricing  could  produce  sig-
nificant economic  effects.
For districts  where  the  construction  sub-
sidy  per  acre  exceeds  the  project  benefits
captured through  increased  land  values,  full
subsidy  recovery  through  full-cost  pricing
would  greatly  reduce  financial  viability  and
could  force  land  values  below  its  value  in
alternative  uses.  3 That  is,  if full-cost  water
prices  were  set  in  these  districts  at  a  level
high enough  to recapture  the  subsidy,  land
values  would  probably  fall  to  a  level  below
the excess land  value and landowners  would
be  worse  off than  if the  project  had  never
been built.14
Districts  where  project  benefits  captured
by landowners and operators  exceed the sub-
sidy  would  probably  observe  a  decline  in
current  market  land  values  (on  nonexcess
land)  but land  market prices  would  still  ex-
ceed the excess  land  values.
To the extent that increased  water charges
induce  farm  operators  to invest in more wa-
ter  conserving  practices  and  technologies,
water  use  per acre  would  be  reduced.  The
water thus conserved could be used in a wide
range  of uses including:  irrigating  additional
land  within  the district  or in other  districts,
instream  uses  for  recreation,  fish  and  wild-
life;  or left in  storage  for year-end  carryover
and  peak power generation.  Increased  water
conservation  may  also  help  mitigate  local
drainage  problems.
1
3Long-term  contractual  obligations  could  force  land
values  below  the "excess  value"  even if no water was
purchased.
4Miller, et al. [p.  23]  present a more detailed  develop-
ment of this problem.
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A large increase in water costs would cause
significant  shifts  in the  district crop  pattern.
Acreage  of  many  forage  crops;  alfalfa  hay,
native hay and irrigated  pasture would  prob-
ably  decline.  This  in  turn,  would  probably
trigger  changes  in the  local  livestock  econo-
my due to  increased market prices for forage
and roughages.  Up to a point,  irrigated  food
and feedgrains would replace these forages  in
the  crop  pattern.  In  areas  with  sufficient
rainfall,  dryland  crops  would  replace  irri-
gated crops.
Conclusion
Both the equity and the efficiency goals are
clouded  by the problem of apparently  ineffi-
cient  projects.  That is,  ex  post,  some  of the
projects,  on  a  purely  economic  efficiency
criteria  (seven  out  of  18)  should  not  have
been  built  or portions  of the  project  should
not  have  been  included  within  the  service
area.  However,  these projects were built and
people  were  induced  to  invest  in  irrigation
improvements.
Interior's  Proposed  Rules and Regulations
[USDI]  appears  to  seek  a  compromise  be-
tween  equity  and efficiency  by  (1) retaining
the  ownership  limit  at  160  acres  per  adult
owner  and  (2)  placing  a  limit  on  the  total
acreage  owned  and  leased  at  960  acres  per
farm.  The  ownership  limit  continues  the  79
year  policy  of  distributing  the  subsidy  as
widely as practicable.  The limit on operating
unit size of 960 acres appears to recognize  the
efficiency argument that more than 160 acres
would be  required  in order  to  achieve  most
of the  potential  economies  of  size.  Placing
any upper limit on the size of operating units
implies that (1)  imperfect land rental markets
could allow lessees to capture  a portion of the
subsidy and  that the distribution  of projects
cannot be controlled  by only limiting owner-
ship,  (2)  increasing  the  number  of farming
units  in  a fixed  land  area creates  more  pos-
sibilities  for  new  farmers  to  enter  farming
and  (3)  allows existing  small farms  to  expand
to a more efficient  size.
In  this  era  of  diminished  public  sector
funding,  a  two-tiered,  full-cost  pricing
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scheme which recaptures  and returns  to the
Treasury  the  land values  enhancement  due
to the  project may  be both a politically  and
economically  viable  alternative  to  adminis-
trative  regulation.
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